International order is, first of all, an instrument of governance on the part of those states that are ready to provide force so that others follow the rules of the game. It is not necessary at all that leading countries outside the traditional circle of great Western powers are ready to take on the burden of coercion of other states of the world, which would be an absolutely inevitable consequence of their commitment to some abstract order. Moreover, the second purpose of the international order – preventing revolutionary situations from arising – is quite effectively limited in the modern world by the military superiority of a narrow group of great nuclear powers. Whether we like it or not, the number of such countries will not become significant in the coming decades. This means that comparative stability and the absence of a general war will be ensured by their mutual deterrence and, at the same time, the inability of others to mount a mortal challenge to their power.
In fact, it may be a deep mistake to expect that great powers of modern times like China or India have such a passionate desire to take part in the creation of a new international order. At least in the traditional understanding of this concept. All previous international orders were the product of conflict within the West, in which Russia periodically found itself involved. Moreover, it is involved so seriously that it created the impression of its complete fusion with the strategic space of the West. The decisive role of Russia (the USSR) in the outcome of the Second World War, as well as the formal world order that emerged as a result of it, really indicate the deepest Russian involvement. We can even say that the modern international order, at the center of which is the UN system, was the result of Russian participation in an initially intra-Western conflict.
The fact is that the changing balance of power on a global scale and the inability of previous leaders to maintain their positions causes a fundamental restructuring of the international order. It has become a common opinion in recent years. It is difficult to argue with its validity: first of all, because the power base has really changed – there is no longer a group of countries in the world capable of imposing their ideas of justice on others. In addition, there has been a noticeable weakening of traditional international institutions and, at the same time, a rethinking of their goals, tasks and activities. Also, judging by everything, the strategic decline of Europe has entered its final phase – a region that embodies the custom of interaction between states within the framework of a certain relatively legitimate order. But in entering this discussion, it would be imprudent, it seems, to ignore the question of what, in fact, this order is?
International order is, first of all, an instrument of governance on the part of those states that are ready to provide force so that others follow the rules of the game. It is not necessary at all that leading countries outside the traditional circle of great Western powers are ready to take on the burden of coercion of other states of the world, which would be an absolutely inevitable consequence of their commitment to some abstract order. Moreover, the second purpose of the international order – preventing revolutionary situations from arising – is quite effectively limited in the modern world by the military superiority of a narrow group of great nuclear powers. Whether we like it or not, the number of such countries will not become significant in the coming decades. This means that comparative stability and the absence of a general war will be ensured by their mutual deterrence and, at the same time, the inability of others to mount a mortal challenge to their power.
In fact, it may be a deep mistake to expect that great powers of modern times like China or India have such a passionate desire to take part in the creation of a new international order. At least in the traditional understanding of this concept. All previous international orders were the product of conflict within the West, in which Russia periodically found itself involved. Moreover, it is involved so seriously that it created the impression of its complete fusion with the strategic space of the West. The decisive role of Russia (the USSR) in the outcome of the Second World War, as well as the formal world order that emerged as a result of it, really indicate the deepest Russian involvement. We can even say that the modern international order, at the center of which is the UN system, was the result of Russian participation in an initially intra-Western conflict.
Although in a broader context, the sincerity of Russia's intentions to create an international order can be questioned: historically, it has not been part of the system of interstate relations of the West and, interfering in the process of its changes, it set itself specific tasks of its own. The most important of which has always been the preservation of its own unique niche in world affairs - this is precisely why Russia has repeatedly fought with the West, demonstrating fantastic persistence and dedication. However, it is not so obvious that Russia's real goal was to build an international order based on its power capabilities. It is no coincidence that already at the end of the 18th century, Russia expressed a desire to be the "arbiter of Europe", i.e. stand above the European order, and at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the behavior of its ruler, Emperor Alexander I, stood out from the general line of European diplomatic figures. In other words, Russia has always been too independent, large, and self-sufficient to be fundamentally dependent on the international order or to get benefits from it comparable to those received by Europe and, later, the United States of America.
What can we say about the great powers of today, which have never considered the international order as the most important tool for their survival and domination. We can assume that for them it was and remains either a very abstract concept, or a completely distant way the Western countries ruled the world by force. This question, it seems, is important and the answer to it can significantly adjust our ideal ideas about the future. Given the inevitability that the changes taking place in the world entail a broad discussion, it would be reasonable to pay some attention to it. First, because this discussion will in any case remain in the center of attention as long as the West with its ideas and special foreign policy culture retains its position as the global center of power. Second, because scientists and statesmen of the countries of the World Majority are also ready to reason very competently in categories of international order. Although they may mean by this something completely different from what traditional Western political thought has in mind.
It is also completely unclear to what extent the concept of international order itself is shared by the rest of the world's countries, which we in Russia consider to be a fairly large group of the World Majority. For a mass of medium and even large states, the preservation of international law, their only formal protection from the tyranny of the strongest ones, may be of comparatively great importance. Although its effectiveness has been under serious question in recent decades, and even earlier. But, be that as it may, modern international law does indeed give a huge number of states at least hope that the strongest ones will find a reason to split over the fate of the less powerful members of the community. In the same way, large and medium powers are interested in preserving the central significance of the UN in international life: because their right to participate in solving the most important global problems can be quite successfully converted into a tool to achieve their own development or security goals.
Another matter is international order as a concept, behind which there is always some informal agreement on the methods of its maintenance. We know from classical literature on world politics that the most important condition for the emergence of such an order is its legitimacy in the eyes of its participants and, accordingly, their mutual recognition as legitimate participants in international relations. It is also widely known that the comparative stability of such an order is ensured by the inclusion in its governing body of all countries that have the strength to destroy it and make a revolution. However, if the question of revolution is not even theoretically relevant, and the previous leaders are already losing their ability to exploit others, then why invest their resources in a new order? Moreover, it will be difficult to create a legitimate basis for it. And it is not particularly necessary given the preservation of the UN and the basic principles of its Charter.
Ultimately, we may face a situation where the international order proposed by the West will cease to be in demand, and no one will be in a hurry to create a new one with the same goals and a willingness to incur the same costs. Or a certain balance will gradually emerge, which scientists will naturally call a new international order, but it will have very little in common with the previous ones. Both on a conceptual level and, what is even more important, on a practical level.
To sum up, we can say that the day is not far off when the category of international order itself will finally lose its former meaning. Approximately the same as happened with the concept of multipolarity. Now it means something completely different from what was intended by the creators of this theoretical construct in the middle of the last century.
Source: Valdai. Discussion club
